Indian Institute of Public Administration

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Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection (Record no. 525530)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01158nam a22001337a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240320b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Pires, H.C., Chade, H. and Swinkels, J.
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc The American Economic Review
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 114(1), Jan, 2024: p.1.37
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc While many real-world principal-agent problems have both moral hazard and adverse selection, existing tools largely analyze only one at a time. Do the insights from the separate analyses survive when the frictions are combined? We develop a simple method—decoupling—to study both problems at once. When decoupling works, everything we know from the separate analyses carries over, but interesting interactions also arise. We provide simple tests for whether decoupling is valid. We develop and numerically implement an algorithm to calculate the decoupled solution and check its validity. We also provide primitives for decoupling to work and analyze several extensions.- Reproduced

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20220100
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading The American Economic Review
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2024-03-20 114(1), Jan, 2024: p.1.37 AR131328 2024-03-20 Articles

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