Corruption, elite contestation, and parliaments: Why do legislatures become stronger in authoritarian regimes? (Record no. 526804)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
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| fixed length control field | 02248nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 240626b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Wiebrecht, Felix |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Corruption, elite contestation, and parliaments: Why do legislatures become stronger in authoritarian regimes? |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc | Political Research Quarterly |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 77(1), Mar, 2024: p.255-269 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc | A growing body of literature studies the personalization of power in authoritarian regimes. Yet, how institutions can become a credible constraint to dictatorial rule is less widely studied. I theorize that corruption is a key factor associated with stronger legislatures in authoritarian regimes. By engaging in corruption, authoritarian elites in ruling coalitions can build up networks of support and influence and ultimately, use their elevated position to impel more legislative powers vis-à-vis the executive. Examining panel data on the strength of legislatures in authoritarian regimes between 1946 and 2010, I show empirically that authoritarian parliaments are stronger when levels of corruption in a given regime are high. The link between corruption and legislative strength is especially strong in the Middle East and Africa, and primarily applies to party-based and military dictatorships. More competitive electoral and legislative processes, however, do not uniformly affect parliaments’ strength. These findings contribute to our understanding of institutional changes in autocracies and highlight the centrality of elite contestations in determining institutional trajectories.- Reproduced https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10659129231205296 |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Personalization of power, Authoritarian regimes, Legislative strength, Institutional constraints, Corruption networks, Ruling coalitions, Executive-legislative balance, Middle East, Africa, Party-based dictatorships, Military dictatorships, Electoral competitiveness, Institutional change, Elite contestation, Panel data analysis, Autocratic governance, Political institutions, Legislative empowerment, Authoritarian parliaments, Regime dynamics, Comparative politics |
| 9 (RLIN) | 55217 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Main entry heading | Political Research Quarterly |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) | |
| Subject DIP | CORRUPTION |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Item type | Articles |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Permanent location | Current location | Date acquired | Serial Enumeration / chronology | Barcode | Date last seen | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indian Institute of Public Administration | Indian Institute of Public Administration | 2024-06-26 | 77(1), Mar, 2024: p.255-269 | AR132367 | 2024-06-26 | Articles |