Patient versus provider incentives in long-term care (Record no. 527492)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02226nam a22001577a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240902b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Hackmann, M.B., Pohl, R.V. and Ziebarth, N.R.
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Patient versus provider incentives in long-term care
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 16(3), Jul, 2024: p. 178-218
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc This study analyzes 551,000 nursing home stays to examine how patient and provider incentives shape long-term care provision. It finds that Medicaid-covered residents tend to extend their stays due to limited cost-sharing, while nursing homes shorten these stays when capacity constraints arise to accommodate more profitable private payers. Providers demonstrate greater responsiveness to financial incentives than patients. Consequently, reforms targeting provider behavior—such as episode-based reimbursement—are more effective than increasing patient cost-sharing in promoting transitions to community-based care and achieving long-term care savings. :How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551,000 nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, due to limited cost-sharing, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their nursing home stays instead of transitioning to community-based care. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.- Reproduced

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20210264
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Long-Term Care, Patient Incentives, Provider Incentives, Medicaid, Nursing Home Stays, Cost Sharing, Facility Capacity, Private Payers, Financial Elasticity, Episode-Based Reimbursement, Community-Based Care, Payment Models
9 (RLIN) 57715
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP HEALTH SERVICES
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2024-09-02 16(3), Jul, 2024: p. 178-218 AR132933 2024-09-02 Articles

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