Are educated candidates less corrupt bureaucrats? Evidence from randomized audits in Brazil (Record no. 527679)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
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| fixed length control field | 01644nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 240913b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Melo, Caíque and Tigre, Robson |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Are educated candidates less corrupt bureaucrats? Evidence from randomized audits in Brazil |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc | Economic Development and Cultural Change |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 72(3), Apr, 2024: p.1493-1526 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc | In this paper, we test whether more educated candidates make less corrupt public managers. Leveraging electoral regression discontinuity design and a randomized inspection program, we show that more educated candidates commit 32% fewer moderate infringements (associated with public management), but we do not find a differential in severe irregularities (corruption related). Exploiting data on judicial records, we find this effect does not stem from differences in corrupt behavior and might be explained by differences in managerial skills. In addition, more educated mayors have the same chance of running again and being reelected as their less educated peers. Taking advantage of administrative labor records, our examination of possible mechanisms shows that educated candidates have more previous experience in the public sector and high-skill positions. Finally, we find no difference in the provision of public goods between these two groups. In summary, we find that more educated candidates are more effective bureaucrats rather than better politicians.- Reproduced https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/722486 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Main entry heading | Economic Development and Cultural Change |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) | |
| Subject DIP | CIVIL SERVICE |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Item type | Articles |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Permanent location | Current location | Date acquired | Serial Enumeration / chronology | Barcode | Date last seen | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indian Institute of Public Administration | Indian Institute of Public Administration | 2024-09-13 | 72(3), Apr, 2024: p.1493-1526 | AR133115 | 2024-09-13 | Articles |