Correlation neglect in student-to-school matching (Record no. 527784)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
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| fixed length control field | 02338nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 240924b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Rees-Jones, Alex Shorrer, Ran and Tergiman, Chloe |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Correlation neglect in student-to-school matching |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 16(3), Aug, 2024: p.1-42 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc | This paper presents results from three incentivized experiments on school choice scenarios, examining how correlation in admissions decisions affects student application strategies. When schools’ assessments of students are based on a common priority, inducing correlation, students’ strategies decline in quality: applications become more aggressive and fail to include attractive “safety” options. A battery of tests suggests that this phenomenon is at least partially driven by correlation neglect, where students underestimate the impact of correlated outcomes. The findings have significant implications for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms, highlighting the need to account for behavioral biases in educational policy and admissions systems. Authors present results from three experiments containing incentivized school choice scenarios. In these scenarios, we vary whether schools' assessments of students are based on a common priority (inducing correlation in admissions decisions) or are based on independent assessments (eliminating correlation in admissions decisions). The quality of students' application strategies declines in the presence of correlated admissions: application strategies become substantially more aggressive and fail to include attractive "safety" options. We provide a battery of tests suggesting that this phenomenon is at least partially driven by correlation neglect, and we discuss implications for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20200407 |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Education, School Choice, Admissions Decisions, Correlation Neglect, Application Strategies, Safety Options, Incentivized Experiments, Student-to-School Matching, Behavioral Economics, Public Policy, Experimental Evidence |
| 9 (RLIN) | 58459 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Main entry heading | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) | |
| Subject DIP | EDUCATION |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Item type | Articles |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Permanent location | Current location | Date acquired | Serial Enumeration / chronology | Barcode | Date last seen | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indian Institute of Public Administration | Indian Institute of Public Administration | 2024-09-24 | 16(3), Aug, 2024: p.1-42 | AR133217 | 2024-09-24 | Articles |