Organized crime and economic growth: Evidence from municipalities infiltrated by the mafia (Record no. 527841)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02354nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 240927b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Fenizia, Alessandra and Saggio, Raffaele |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Organized crime and economic growth: Evidence from municipalities infiltrated by the mafia |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc | The American Economic Review |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 114(7), Jul, 2024: p.2171-2200 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc | This paper studies the long-run economic impact of dismissing city councils infiltrated by organized crime in Italy. Using a matched difference-in-differences design applied to the universe of Italian social security records, the analysis finds that city council dismissals (CCDs) increase employment, firm creation, and industrial real estate prices. The effects are concentrated in Mafia-dominated sectors and in municipalities where fewer incumbents are reelected. By weakening the Mafia and fostering trust in local institutions, CCDs generate substantial economic returns. The findings suggest that dismissals represent an effective intervention for establishing legitimacy and spurring economic activity in areas dominated by organized crime, with broader implications for governance and development policy. This paper studies the long-run economic impact of dismissing city councils infiltrated by organized crime. Applying a matched difference-in-differences design to the universe of Italian social security records, we find that city council dismissals (CCDs) increase employment, the number of firms, and industrial real estate prices. The effects are concentrated in Mafia-dominated sectors and in municipalities where fewer incumbents are reelected. The dismissals generate large economic returns by weakening the Mafia and fostering trust in local institutions. The analysis suggests that CCDs represent an effective intervention for establishing legitimacy and spurring economic activity in areas dominated by organized crime.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20221687 |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Political Economy, Organized Crime, Mafia, City Council Dismissals, Economic Growth, Employment, Firm Formation, Industrial Real Estate, Trust in Institutions, Criminology, Development Economics, Italy, Governance, Legitimacy |
| 9 (RLIN) | 58921 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Main entry heading | The American Economic Review |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) | |
| Subject DIP | POLITICAL ECONOMY |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Item type | Articles |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Permanent location | Current location | Date acquired | Serial Enumeration / chronology | Barcode | Date last seen | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indian Institute of Public Administration | Indian Institute of Public Administration | 2024-09-27 | 114(7), Jul, 2024: p.2171-2200 | AR133274 | 2024-09-27 | Articles |