Loyalty signaling, bureaucratic compliance, and variation in state repression in authoritarian regimes (Record no. 528404)

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fixed length control field 01528nam a22001457a 4500
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fixed length control field 241204b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Qian, Jingyuan and Bai, Steve
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Loyalty signaling, bureaucratic compliance, and variation in state repression in authoritarian regimes
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc Comparative Politics
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 56(3), Jul, 2024: p.423-447
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc In autocracies, why are certain bureaucrats more heavy-handed in their use of force than others during repression? In this article, we propose an incentive-compatible theory that explains the uneven compliance of bureaucrats in repressive campaigns. We argue that bureaucrats from less trusted backgrounds tend to implement repressive tasks more fervently to credibly display loyalty and bolster their career prospects. We provide evidence for our theory using China’s Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957‐1959), a repressive campaign launched by Mao Zedong against alleged critics of his rule. We find that officials who were former undercover partisans, a faction considered untrustworthy by Mao, tended to prosecute more “rightists” in their jurisdictions and imposed harsher penalties on them. This study contributes to the literature by revealing the motivations of coercive agents.- Reproduced

https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2024/00000056/00000004/art00002
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Anti-rightist campaign, Authoritarian regime, China, Maozedong, Repression.
9 (RLIN) 49276
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading Comparative Politics
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2024-12-04 56(3), Jul, 2024: p.423-447 AR133795 2024-12-04 Articles

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