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01321pab a2200169 454500 |
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180718b2005 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Saiegh, Sebastian M. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Do countries have a "democratic advantage"? Political institutions multilateral agencies, and sovereign borrowing |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
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| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2005 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
p.366-87. |
| 362 ## - DATES OF PUBLICATION AND/OR SEQUENTIAL DESIGNATION |
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| Dates of publication and/or sequential designation |
May |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc. |
This article examines the effect of political institutions on countries' risk characteristics and the role that domestic political institutions pay in determining the interest rates charged to less developed countries. According to the "democratic advantage" argument, democracies should pay lower interest rates than authoritarian regimes because they are better able to make credible commitments. The author argues that such a claim must be revised in the case of developing countries. The results presented in this article support this assertion. First, they show that democracies are more likely to reschedule their debts, so they have no advantage; rather, the opposite is true. Second, there does not appear to be a significant difference between the interest rates paid by democracies and nondemocracies. - Reproduced. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Interest rates |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Political institutions |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
Comparative Political Studies |
| 909 ## - |
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| -- |
65166 |
