| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01256pab a2200169 454500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
180718b2009 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Putterman, Louis |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Human nature, communication and trust |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
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| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2009 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
p.119-31. |
| 362 ## - DATES OF PUBLICATION AND/OR SEQUENTIAL DESIGNATION |
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| Dates of publication and/or sequential designation |
Mar |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc. |
The facts that people can sometimes commit to fulfill promises even when there are no binding penalties and that kind and trusting acts are often reciprocated by trust-worthy ones make possible forms of group action that might be ruled out in a hypothetical world of perfectly opportunistic individuals. I discuss some new experiments with a modified Berg. Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) `trust game' that provide evidence that most subjects adhere to non-binding agreements, that many are prepared to rely on trust rather than use binding but moderately costly contracts, that the possibility of exchanging words rather than mere numerical proposals enhances trusting and trustworthiness, and that subjects are drawn to fa ir and efficient exchanges despite the self-interest model's prediction of outcomes more favorable to first-movers. - Reproduced. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Human species |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics |
| 908 ## - PUT COMMAND PARAMETER (RLIN) |
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| Put command parameter |
N |
| 909 ## - |
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| -- |
81596 |
