| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01100pab a2200169 454500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
180718b2009 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
leaver, Clare |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Bureaucratic minimal squawk behavior: theory and evidence from regulatory agencies |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2009 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
p.572-607. |
| 362 ## - DATES OF PUBLICATION AND/OR SEQUENTIAL DESIGNATION |
|---|
| Dates of publication and/or sequential designation |
Jun |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
This paper develops a model in which a desire to avoid criticism prompts otherwise public-spirited bureaucrats to behave inefficiently. Decisions are taken to keep interest groups quiet and to keep mistakes out of the public eye. The policy implications of this "minimal squqawk" behavior are at odds with the view that agencies should be structured to minimize the threat of "capture". An empirical test using data from US State Public Utility Commissions rejects the capture hypothesis and is consistent with the squawk hypothesis: longer PUC terms of office are associated with a higher incidence of rate reviews and lower household electricity bills. - Reproduced. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Civil service |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
American Economic Review |
| 908 ## - PUT COMMAND PARAMETER (RLIN) |
|---|
| Put command parameter |
N |
| 909 ## - |
|---|
| -- |
83570 |
