Indian Institute of Public Administration

Your cart is empty.
Normal view MARC view

Personalization of power, Authoritarian regimes, Legislative strength, Institutional constraints, Corruption networks, Ruling coalitions, Executive-legislative balance, Middle East, Africa, Party-based dictatorships, Military dictatorships, Electoral competitiveness, Institutional change, Elite contestation, Panel data analysis, Autocratic governance, Political institutions, Legislative empowerment, Authoritarian parliaments, Regime dynamics, Comparative politics (Topical Term)

Number of records used in: 1
Preferred form: Personalization of power, Authoritarian regimes, Legislative strength, Institutional constraints, Corruption networks, Ruling coalitions, Executive-legislative balance, Middle East, Africa, Party-based dictatorships, Military dictatorships, Electoral competitiveness, Institutional change, Elite contestation, Panel data analysis, Autocratic governance, Political institutions, Legislative empowerment, Authoritarian parliaments, Regime dynamics, Comparative politics

Machine generated authority record.

Work cat.: (OSt)526804: Wiebrecht, Felix 55216, Corruption, elite contestation, and parliaments: Why do legislatures become stronger in authoritarian regimes?

Powered by Koha