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Power, strategy and games economic regulation of a privatized utility.

By: Melville, Abigail.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticleDescription: p.129-55.Subject(s): Public utilities - Great Britain | Regional water and sewage companies | Water authority | Public policy - Great Britain | Privatization - Great Britain | Water supply - Great Britain In: Management in GovernmentSummary: "This article rejects conventional `rational actor' models of economic regulation in favour of a focus on processes of resource exchange and dependence. Using a case study of Yorkshire Water it identifies the membership and structure of the regulatory arena, the resources available to regulatory actors, the `rules of the game', and the strategies adopted by regulator and regulated. It highlights the structurally privileged position of investors in water regulation and concludes that decision-making excludes customer interests; decisions are made by professional actors on the basis of co-operation and consensus; the regulator is relatively weak and depends on companies compliance to maintain its own legitimacy; and large companies have a great range of strategic options in pursuit of regulatory advantage"
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Articles Articles Indian Institute of Public Administration
Volume no: 26, Issue no: 1-4 Available AR30079

"This article rejects conventional `rational actor' models of economic regulation in favour of a focus on processes of resource exchange and dependence. Using a case study of Yorkshire Water it identifies the membership and structure of the regulatory arena, the resources available to regulatory actors, the `rules of the game', and the strategies adopted by regulator and regulated. It highlights the structurally privileged position of investors in water regulation and concludes that decision-making excludes customer interests; decisions are made by professional actors on the basis of co-operation and consensus; the regulator is relatively weak and depends on companies compliance to maintain its own legitimacy; and large companies have a great range of strategic options in pursuit of regulatory advantage"

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