Budgetary collective action problems: convergence and compliance under the Maastricht Treaty on European Union
By: Savage, James D.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 2001Description: p.43-53.Subject(s): European union | Budget - United States | Budget
In:
Public Administration ReviewSummary: Budgetary agreements may be thought of as collective action problems in which the problem at hand is maintaining group cohesion by controlling free riders. The standard solution to the free rider problem includes monitoring group behavior and imposing sanctions. This article analyzes the collective action problem present in the budgetary provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, which created the Economic Monetary Union, by focusing on the four stages of budgetary compliance that are evident in all budgetary agreements and treaties. - Reproduced
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Volume no: 61, Issue no: 1 | Available | AR49621 |
Budgetary agreements may be thought of as collective action problems in which the problem at hand is maintaining group cohesion by controlling free riders. The standard solution to the free rider problem includes monitoring group behavior and imposing sanctions. This article analyzes the collective action problem present in the budgetary provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, which created the Economic Monetary Union, by focusing on the four stages of budgetary compliance that are evident in all budgetary agreements and treaties. - Reproduced
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