Discovering the dark side of power: the principal�s moral hazard in political-bureaucratic relations
By: Dohler, Marian.
Material type:
BookPublisher: 2018Description: p.190-202.Subject(s): Bureaucracy | Civil service | Politics and administration | Politics and government
In:
International Journal of Public AdministrationSummary: Principal agent (PA) is among the most prominent concepts for analyzing the relationship between politics and bureaucracy. Nonethelesss, the inherent bias of PA scholars to attribute moral hazard almost exclusively to the agent, usually referred to as �bureaucratic drift�, requires re-examination. Building on the spare literature in which moral hazard of the principal is considered, this paper provides empirical evidence for a neglected aspect of the PA concept. Three cases of German regulatory agencies responsible for drug control, financial services and rail safety are analyzed in critical situations which were largely perceived as bureaucratic failures. The analysis reveals that a good deal of these failures, ranging from negligence to suppressing crucial information, has to be attributed to the political principal. This is called the dark side of power because the intention is to shift blame or to dodge political responsibility. Turning conventional PA reasoning upside down, the conclusion is that the principal�s moral hazard should be considered more routinely as a potential explanation for political-bureaucratic interactions. - Reproduced.
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 41(3), Feb, 2018: p.190-202. | Available | AR118523 |
Feb
Principal agent (PA) is among the most prominent concepts for analyzing the relationship between politics and bureaucracy. Nonethelesss, the inherent bias of PA scholars to attribute moral hazard almost exclusively to the agent, usually referred to as �bureaucratic drift�, requires re-examination. Building on the spare literature in which moral hazard of the principal is considered, this paper provides empirical evidence for a neglected aspect of the PA concept. Three cases of German regulatory agencies responsible for drug control, financial services and rail safety are analyzed in critical situations which were largely perceived as bureaucratic failures. The analysis reveals that a good deal of these failures, ranging from negligence to suppressing crucial information, has to be attributed to the political principal. This is called the dark side of power because the intention is to shift blame or to dodge political responsibility. Turning conventional PA reasoning upside down, the conclusion is that the principal�s moral hazard should be considered more routinely as a potential explanation for political-bureaucratic interactions. - Reproduced.
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