Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Anatomy of an informal institution: The ‘Gentlemen’s Pact’ and judicial selection in Mexico, 1917–1994

By: Pozas-Loyo, Andrea.
Contributor(s): Rios-Figueroa, Julio.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: 2018Description: p.647-661.Subject(s): Supreme Court - Mexico In: Journal of Social PolicySummary: The Mexican Constitution of 1917 granted the Supreme Court the power to handpick lower court judges and oversee their careers. For almost eight decades this capacity was not regulated. To fill this void, the justices began to take turns filling vacancies which developed into an informal institution – the so-called ‘Gentlemen’s Pact’. Using original archival data, we document and describe the birth and development of this practice and argue that it consolidated into an informal institution as the judiciary increased in size. We uncover the workings of this social norm that established a patronage model of judicial selection. Our analysis period ends in 1994, when a constitutional reform created a judicial council with the explicit aim of ending patronage and corruption within the judiciary. - Reproduced.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Item type Current location Call number Vol info Status Date due Barcode
Articles Articles Indian Institute of Public Administration
39(5), Nov, 2018: p.647-661. Available AR119548

The Mexican Constitution of 1917 granted the Supreme Court the power to handpick lower court judges and oversee their careers. For almost eight decades this capacity was not regulated. To fill this void, the justices began to take turns filling vacancies which developed into an informal institution – the so-called ‘Gentlemen’s Pact’. Using original archival data, we document and describe the birth and development of this practice and argue that it consolidated into an informal institution as the judiciary increased in size. We uncover the workings of this social norm that established a patronage model of judicial selection. Our analysis period ends in 1994, when a constitutional reform created a judicial council with the explicit aim of ending patronage and corruption within the judiciary. - Reproduced.

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.

Powered by Koha