Democracy, ethnoicracy and convocational democracy
By: Stojanovic, Nenad
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: International Political Science Review Description: 41(1), Jan, 2020: p.30-43.Subject(s): Consociationalism, Centripetalism, democracy, Demoicracy, Ethnoicracy, Demos
In:
International Political Science ReviewSummary: This article questions the notion of ‘consociational democracy’. It argues that it rests on shaky ground,
empirically and conceptually. As an empirical matter, a consociation is inherently unstable because it
tends either to collapse into ethnoicracy (where the power is shared by the main ethnic groups so that
citizens who do not belong to them are politically marginalized) or to become a non-consociational, liberal
democracy. At the conceptual level ‘consociational democracy’ is an impossibility because a polity cannot be
both constitutional and democratic. This article argues that consociations can be at best demoicracies – that
is, polities composed not of a single demos but of multiple demoi. Yet the problem of stability remains. The
article concludes with the suggestion that the stability problem can be addressed by adopting a weak form
of democracy – the ‘demoi-within-demos’ constellation – where a thin demos coexists with multiple demoi.- Reproduced
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 41(1), Jan, 2020: p.30-43 | Available | AR123349 |
This article questions the notion of ‘consociational democracy’. It argues that it rests on shaky ground,
empirically and conceptually. As an empirical matter, a consociation is inherently unstable because it
tends either to collapse into ethnoicracy (where the power is shared by the main ethnic groups so that
citizens who do not belong to them are politically marginalized) or to become a non-consociational, liberal
democracy. At the conceptual level ‘consociational democracy’ is an impossibility because a polity cannot be
both constitutional and democratic. This article argues that consociations can be at best demoicracies – that
is, polities composed not of a single demos but of multiple demoi. Yet the problem of stability remains. The
article concludes with the suggestion that the stability problem can be addressed by adopting a weak form
of democracy – the ‘demoi-within-demos’ constellation – where a thin demos coexists with multiple demoi.- Reproduced
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