Criminal deterrence when there are offsetting risks: Traffic cameras, vehicular accidents, and public safety
By: Gallagher, Justin. and Fisher, Paul J
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal Economic Policy Description: 12(3), Aug, 2020: p.202-237.Subject(s): Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
In:
American Economic Journal Economic PolicySummary: Numerous cities have enacted electronic monitoring programs at traffic intersections in an effort to reduce the high number of vehicle accidents. The rationale is that the higher expected fines for running a red light will induce drivers to stop and lead to fewer cross-road collisions. However, the cameras also incentivize drivers to accept a greater accident risk from stopping. We evaluate the termination of a monitoring program via a voter referendum using 12 years of geocoded police accident data. We find that the cameras changed the composition of accidents but no evidence of a reduction in total accidents or injuries. – Reproduced
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 12(3), Aug, 2020: p.202-237 | Available | AR124145 |
Numerous cities have enacted electronic monitoring programs at traffic intersections in an effort to reduce the high number of vehicle accidents. The rationale is that the higher expected fines for running a red light will induce drivers to stop and lead to fewer cross-road collisions. However, the cameras also incentivize drivers to accept a greater accident risk from stopping. We evaluate the termination of a monitoring program via a voter referendum using 12 years of geocoded police accident data. We find that the cameras changed the composition of accidents but no evidence of a reduction in total accidents or injuries. – Reproduced
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