Competition, product proliferation, and welfare: A study of the US smartphone market
By: Hanany, Eran. Peter, Klibanoff and Sujoy, Mukerji
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal Microeconomics Description: 12(2), May, 2020: p.135-187.Subject(s): Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests
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American Economic Journal MicroeconomicsSummary: We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality—each player's strategy is optimal at each information set given opponents' strategies. We show sequential optimality, which does not make any explicit assumption on updating, is equivalent to sequential optimality with respect to beliefs updated using a particular generalization of Bayesian updating. Ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria compatible with players sharing common ambiguous beliefs. We connect ambiguity aversion with belief robustness. Examples illustrate new strategic behavior, including strategic use of ambiguity, under ambiguity aversion. - Reproduced
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 12(2), May, 2020: p.135-187 | Available | AR124167 |
We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality—each player's strategy is optimal at each information set given opponents' strategies. We show sequential optimality, which does not make any explicit assumption on updating, is equivalent to sequential optimality with respect to beliefs updated using a particular generalization of Bayesian updating. Ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria compatible with players sharing common ambiguous beliefs. We connect ambiguity aversion with belief robustness. Examples illustrate new strategic behavior, including strategic use of ambiguity, under ambiguity aversion. - Reproduced
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