Non-use of offensive Air power in 1962 was a mistake but does not tell the whole story
By: Subramaniam, Arjun
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: U.S.I. Journal Description: 150(621), Jul-Sep, 2020: p.309-319.Subject(s): North-East frontier agency (NEFA), Indian air Force's, 1962 war
In:
U.S.I. JournalSummary: The non-use of offensive air power in the India-China conflict of 1962 is among the most discussed issues in the contemporary India-China discourse. There was a complete lack of understanding on the part of the strategic establishment of what offensive air power could achieve in Ladakh and North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Compounding this was a lack of clarity within the Indian Army of the value addition provided by the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) fighter fleet and a diffident approach on the part of the IAF leadership to espouse the use of offensive air power. However, the sterling contribution of the IAF’s transport and helicopter fleet during the conflict merits a re-examination. – Reproduced
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 150(621), Jul-Sep, 2020: p.309-319 | Available | AR123861 |
The non-use of offensive air power in the India-China conflict of 1962 is among the most discussed issues in the contemporary India-China discourse. There was a complete lack of understanding on the part of the strategic establishment of what offensive air power could achieve in Ladakh and North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Compounding this was a lack of clarity within the Indian Army of the value addition provided by the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) fighter fleet and a diffident approach on the part of the IAF leadership to espouse the use of offensive air power. However, the sterling contribution of the IAF’s transport and helicopter fleet during the conflict merits a re-examination. – Reproduced
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