Value of incumbency: when platforms face heterogeneous customers
By: Biglaiser, Gary and Cremer, Jacques
.
Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Description: 12(4), Nov, 2020: p.229-269.Subject(s): Market Structure, Pricing, Oligopoly
In:
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsSummary: We study competition for the market in a dynamic model with network externalities, focusing on the efficiency of market outcomes. We propose a representation of the strategic advantages of incumbency and embed it in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. Then, we completely identify the conditions under which inefficient equilibria with several platforms emerge at equilibrium; explore the reasons why these inefficient equilibria arise; and compute the value of incumbency and analyze why static models generally exaggerate it. – Reproduced
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Articles
|
Indian Institute of Public Administration | 12(4), Nov, 2020: p.229-269 | Available | AR124477 |
We study competition for the market in a dynamic model with network externalities, focusing on the efficiency of market outcomes. We propose a representation of the strategic advantages of incumbency and embed it in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. Then, we completely identify the conditions under which inefficient equilibria with several platforms emerge at equilibrium; explore the reasons why these inefficient equilibria arise; and compute the value of incumbency and analyze why static models generally exaggerate it. – Reproduced
There are no comments for this item.