A model of competing narratives
By: Eliaz, Kfir and Spiegler, Ran
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BookPublisher: The American Economic Review Description: 110(12), Dec, 2020: p.3786-3816.Subject(s): Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, Voting behavior, Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 110(12), Dec, 2020: p.3786-3816 | Available | AR124903 |
We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be traced to a "clash of narratives." Drawing on the "Bayesian Networks" literature, we represent a narrative by a causal model that maps actions into consequences, weaving a selection of other random variables into the story. Narratives generate beliefs by interpreting long-run correlations between these variables. An equilibrium is defined as a probability distribution over narrative-policy pairs that maximize a representative agent's anticipatory utility, capturing the idea that people are drawn to hopeful narratives. Our equilibrium analysis sheds light on the structure of prevailing narratives, the variables they involve, the policies they sustain, and their contribution to political polarization. – Reproduced


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