Prosecutor quality, witness participations, crime, and reform
By: Daugherty, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F
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BookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Description: 13(4), Nov, 2021: p.64-100.Subject(s): Prosecutor quality, Witness participations, Crime and reform| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 13(4), Nov, 2021: p.64-100 | Available | AR126641 |
We develop a model wherein concerns about prosecutor quality reduce the willingness of witnesses to cooperate with prosecutors. This causes an increase in the crime rate and in wrongly convicted innocent defendants. Because citizens are taxpayers and may be victims, perpetrators, witnesses, or falsely accused defendants, they care about the prosecutor's quality. They update beliefs about this quality based on the disposition of cases. If the prosecutor's believed quality falls below a threshold, then a majority of voters chooses to replace the prosecutor with a challenger, in expectation of reform. We compare the majority's choice with that of a social planner. – Reproduced


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