Agency heads’ public profiles and bureaucratic performance
By: Lee, Don S
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Review of Public Administration Description: 52(6), Aug, 2022: p.409-422.Subject(s): Agency hand, Public profile, Bureaucratic, South Koran
In:
American Review of Public AdministrationSummary: Do agency heads’ public profiles enhance the performance of bureaucratic agencies? Existing studies of public administration emphasize the role of public information in managing government performance. However, whether public attention to agency heads affects the performance of their agencies is largely understudied. Using a unique dataset of agency heads’ public profiles in South Korea, we predict that such profiles have a positive impact on their agencies’ performance. Although agency heads are not held accountable directly to citizens, close public attention to agency heads’ activities may function as an indirect mechanism of accountability and of improving their organizations’ performance. Our analysis supports our prediction and further suggests that an agency head’s high public profile is a benefit, particularly in more salient policy areas where “going public” is more effective for their policy reforms. Our findings have clear implications: the importance of agency heads’ unconventional roles for effective agency management, responding to rapidly changing external environments.- Reproduced
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 52(6), Aug, 2022: p.409-422 | Available | AR127794 |
Do agency heads’ public profiles enhance the performance of bureaucratic agencies? Existing studies of public administration emphasize the role of public information in managing government performance. However, whether public attention to agency heads affects the performance of their agencies is largely understudied. Using a unique dataset of agency heads’ public profiles in South Korea, we predict that such profiles have a positive impact on their agencies’ performance. Although agency heads are not held accountable directly to citizens, close public attention to agency heads’ activities may function as an indirect mechanism of accountability and of improving their organizations’ performance. Our analysis supports our prediction and further suggests that an agency head’s high public profile is a benefit, particularly in more salient policy areas where “going public” is more effective for their policy reforms. Our findings have clear implications: the importance of agency heads’ unconventional roles for effective agency management, responding to rapidly changing external environments.- Reproduced
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