Robust information transmission
By: Dilmé, Francesc
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Review: Insights Description: 5(1), Mar, 2023: p.111-124.
In:
American Economic Review: InsightsSummary: This paper investigates robust information transmission between a sender and a receiver in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model. We characterize behavior that remains equilibrium behavior independently of the form of a small communication cost. Under standard conditions, we find that an equilibrium outcome is robust if and only if it features a maximal number of on-path actions and each is induced by a single message. The result extends regardless of the direction of the bias, the number of available messages, or whether the objectives of the sender and the receiver are aligned.- Reproduced
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 5(1), Mar, 2023: p.111-124 | Available | AR128634 |
This paper investigates robust information transmission between a sender and a receiver in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model. We characterize behavior that remains equilibrium behavior independently of the form of a small communication cost. Under standard conditions, we find that an equilibrium outcome is robust if and only if it features a maximal number of on-path actions and each is induced by a single message. The result extends regardless of the direction of the bias, the number of available messages, or whether the objectives of the sender and the receiver are aligned.- Reproduced
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