How should sanctions account for bystander countries?
By: Sturm, John
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: AEA Papers and Proceedings Description: 113, May, 2023: p.39-42.
In:
AEA Papers and ProceedingsSummary: Neutral "bystander countries" have profoundly shaped the impact of trade sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. How should sanctions account for the presence of such bystanders? I study this question in a simple trade model where a sanctioning country places tariffs on imports from a sanctioned country in the presence of a neutral third country. Optimal tariffs-as-sanctions are lower on goods that the sanctioner can import from bystanders. On goods that the sanctionee can export to bystanders, tariffs-as-sanctions are higher given an elasticity of (excess) supply to the sanctioner but lower given a total elasticity of supply.- Reproduced
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 113, May, 2023: p.39-42 | Available | AR129552 | ||
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 113, May, 2023: p.39-42 | Available | AR129553 |
Neutral "bystander countries" have profoundly shaped the impact of trade sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. How should sanctions account for the presence of such bystanders? I study this question in a simple trade model where a sanctioning country places tariffs on imports from a sanctioned country in the presence of a neutral third country. Optimal tariffs-as-sanctions are lower on goods that the sanctioner can import from bystanders. On goods that the sanctionee can export to bystanders, tariffs-as-sanctions are higher given an elasticity of (excess) supply to the sanctioner but lower given a total elasticity of supply.- Reproduced
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