The control of the policy advice industry: How patrons defer their decision-rights to think tank boards
By: Perez, Marybel and Agafonow, Alejandro
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: International Review of Administrative Sciences Description: 89(3), Sep, 2023: p.808-824.Subject(s): Policy advice industry, Think tank boards
In:
International Review of Administrative SciencesSummary: Patrons of think tanks—for example, governments, corporations, philanthropists, NGOs, and so forth—may control think tanks’ boards, that is, their highest decision-making body. Whether patrons are likely to control boards is a question that remains under-explored and under-theorised in public administration and governance scholarship. It is posited that patrons are likely to control boards when the marginal benefit of partaking in decision-making does not exceed the cost of information transfer. The comparative examination of International Relations think tanks’ statutes shows that patron control is substantial. However, patronage does not always guarantee board control. Patron control is moderated by the nature of the transaction. The conclusion assesses patron control concerning decision-making processes in the think tank and the idiosyncratic character of policy advice. – Reproduced
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00208523221133065
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 89(3), Sep, 2023: p.808-824 | Available | AR129964 |
Patrons of think tanks—for example, governments, corporations, philanthropists, NGOs, and so forth—may control think tanks’ boards, that is, their highest decision-making body. Whether patrons are likely to control boards is a question that remains under-explored and under-theorised in public administration and governance scholarship. It is posited that patrons are likely to control boards when the marginal benefit of partaking in decision-making does not exceed the cost of information transfer. The comparative examination of International Relations think tanks’ statutes shows that patron control is substantial. However, patronage does not always guarantee board control. Patron control is moderated by the nature of the transaction. The conclusion assesses patron control concerning decision-making processes in the think tank and the idiosyncratic character of policy advice. – Reproduced
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00208523221133065
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