Monitor reputation and transparency
By: Marinovic, Iván and Szydlowski, Martin
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Description: 15(4), Nov, 2023: p.1-67.Subject(s): Regulator Monitor Reputation concerns Manager Manipulation Reputational incentives Intermediate reputation Transparency Disclosure policy Diminished incentives Random delay Noisy information Verifiable disclosure Aggressive disclosure Enforcement tools
In:
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsSummary: We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor's reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator's disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor's reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that feature verifiable disclosure destroy reputational incentives. The regulator discloses more aggressively when she has better enforcement tools.- Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220006
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 15(4), Nov, 2023: p.1-67 | Available | AR131038 |
We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor's reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator's disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor's reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that feature verifiable disclosure destroy reputational incentives. The regulator discloses more aggressively when she has better enforcement tools.- Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220006
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