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Coordination in the fight against collusion

By: Iossa, Elisabetta.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Description: 16(1), Feb, 2024: p.224-261.Subject(s): Antitrust Authorities, Collusive Conduct, Delegation of Deterrence, Procurement Context, Buyer Strategies, Multimarket Buyer, Centralized Procurement Authority, Large Buyers, Susceptibility to Collusion In: American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsSummary: While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to accommodate rather than deter collusion among their suppliers. We also show that a multimarket buyer, such as a centralized procurement authority, may optimally deter collusion when multiple independent buyers would not, consistent with the view that "large" buyers are less susceptible to collusion.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220194#:~:text=By%20contrast%2C%20there%20is%20never,collusive%20conduct%20by%20their%20suppliers.
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Articles Articles Indian Institute of Public Administration
16(1), Feb, 2024: p.224-261 Available AR131738

While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to accommodate rather than deter collusion among their suppliers. We also show that a multimarket buyer, such as a centralized procurement authority, may optimally deter collusion when multiple independent buyers would not, consistent with the view that "large" buyers are less susceptible to collusion.- Reproduced

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220194#:~:text=By%20contrast%2C%20there%20is%20never,collusive%20conduct%20by%20their%20suppliers.

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