Dividing the people: The authoritarian bargain, development, and authoritarian citizenship
By: Vortherms, Samantha A
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: Comparative Politics Description: 56(1), Oct, 2023: p. 95-119.Subject(s): Autocrats, Redistribution, Authoritarian Bargain, Citizenship, Citizenship Institutions, Particularistic Membership, Socio-Economic Rights, Security, Economic Development, China, Decentralized Control, Development Strategies, Semi-Structured Interviews, Government Policies, Local Citizenship, Closure, Strategic Inclusion, Individual-State Relations, Autocratic Contexts
In:
Comparative PoliticsSummary: Autocrats must redistribute to survive, but redistribution is limited and selective. Who is entitled to redistribution underlying the authoritarian bargain? I argue redistribution is a question of citizenship. Autocrats use citizenship institutions, especially particularistic membership, to strategically limit and extend socio-economic rights to ensure both security and economic development. I apply this framework to China, where control over particularistic membership decentralized in conjunction with development strategies. Drawing on semi-structured interviews, government policies, and a database of local citizenship policies in China, I trace how local citizenship creates closure while economic development incentivizes strategic inclusion. By evaluating how authoritarian citizenship functions, this framework increases our understanding of individual-staterelations in autocratic contexts.- Reproduced
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2023/00000056/00000001/art00006
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 56(1), Oct, 2023: p. 95-119 | Available | AR131771 |
Autocrats must redistribute to survive, but redistribution is limited and selective. Who is entitled to redistribution underlying the authoritarian bargain? I argue redistribution is a question of citizenship. Autocrats use citizenship institutions, especially particularistic membership, to strategically limit and extend socio-economic rights to ensure both security and economic development. I apply this framework to China, where control over particularistic membership decentralized in conjunction with development strategies. Drawing on semi-structured interviews, government policies, and a database of local citizenship policies in China, I trace how local citizenship creates closure while economic development incentivizes strategic inclusion. By evaluating how authoritarian citizenship functions, this framework increases our understanding of individual-staterelations in autocratic contexts.- Reproduced
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2023/00000056/00000001/art00006
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