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When do courts constrain the authoritarian state? Judicial decision-making in Jordan and Palestine

By: Schaaf, Steven D.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: Comparative Politics Description: 54(2), Jan, 2022: p.375-410. In: Comparative PoliticsSummary: Under what conditions will authoritarian courts issue decisions that constrain state actors? This study breaks new ground in authoritarianism research by explaining when authoritarian states are—and are not—held accountable to legal norms. I leverage evidence from interviews with Jordanian and Palestinian legal actors, original data on judicial decisions, and two years of fieldwork shadowing judges as they conducted business in the courthouse. I find that courts in Jordan and Palestine are hardly regime pawns, as judges routinely prioritize their own interests above those of regime elites. My results also demonstrate that lawsuits revealing instances of intra-state disunity are particularly good vehicles for expanding judicial authority over state activity and, further, that appellate courts are uniquely less capable of constraining state actors./abs>. Reproduced https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2022/00000054/00000002/art00009
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Articles Articles Indian Institute of Public Administration
54(2), Jan, 2022: p.375-410 Available AR131777

Under what conditions will authoritarian courts issue decisions that constrain state actors? This study breaks new ground in authoritarianism research by explaining when authoritarian states are—and are not—held accountable to legal norms. I leverage evidence from interviews with Jordanian and Palestinian legal actors, original data on judicial decisions, and two years of fieldwork shadowing judges as they conducted business in the courthouse. I find that courts in Jordan and Palestine are hardly regime pawns, as judges routinely prioritize their own interests above those of regime elites. My results also demonstrate that lawsuits revealing instances of intra-state disunity are particularly good vehicles for expanding judicial authority over state activity and, further, that appellate courts are uniquely less capable of constraining state actors./abs>. Reproduced

https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2022/00000054/00000002/art00009

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