Intergovernmental cooperation and joint purchasing agreements: Do governments free-ride?
By: Madsen, Morten Skov
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: Public Administration Review Description: 84(4), Jul-Aug, 2024: p.604-622.
In:
Public Administration ReviewSummary: This article explores the challenges of collective action in intergovernmental cooperation, particularly the risks of free-riding and shirking agreements. Drawing on collective action theory, it examines how governments can overcome these incentives and contribute to the production of collective goods. Using empirical evidence from a national Danish purchasing group, the study demonstrates that coercion is not required to induce subnational governments to incur private costs and actively participate. Despite opportunities to free-ride, governments contribute staff resources and expertise to joint purchasing agreements, enhancing their quality. Multivariate analyses reveal that governments are more likely to contribute when they derive greater benefits, face lower costs, and experience stronger social norm pressures from peers. The findings challenge assumptions about governments’ strategic behavior and highlight the importance of benefits, costs, and peer influence in sustaining intergovernmental cooperation. Public management scholars argue that collective action problems (e.g., incentives to free-ride on the efforts of others or shirk agreements) threaten the feasibility of intergovernmental cooperation. Drawing on collective action theory, this article examines factors associated with overcoming free-riding incentives and provides evidence challenging the idea that governments are prone to such strategic behavior. The empirical analysis of a national Danish purchasing group demonstrates how coercion is not necessary to induce subnational governments to incur private costs to join the group and, despite opportunity and incentive to free-ride, contribute to its production of joint purchasing agreements—collective goods whose quality depends on the staff resources and expertise the participating governments contribute to their production. Further, multivariate analyses find that governments are more likely to help produce these collective goods when they receive more of their benefits, face lower contribution costs, and receive stronger social norm pressures from peers.- Reproduced
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/puar.13727
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 84(4), Jul-Aug, 2024: p.604-622 | Available | AR133155 |
This article explores the challenges of collective action in intergovernmental cooperation, particularly the risks of free-riding and shirking agreements. Drawing on collective action theory, it examines how governments can overcome these incentives and contribute to the production of collective goods. Using empirical evidence from a national Danish purchasing group, the study demonstrates that coercion is not required to induce subnational governments to incur private costs and actively participate. Despite opportunities to free-ride, governments contribute staff resources and expertise to joint purchasing agreements, enhancing their quality. Multivariate analyses reveal that governments are more likely to contribute when they derive greater benefits, face lower costs, and experience stronger social norm pressures from peers. The findings challenge assumptions about governments’ strategic behavior and highlight the importance of benefits, costs, and peer influence in sustaining intergovernmental cooperation. Public management scholars argue that collective action problems (e.g., incentives to free-ride on the efforts of others or shirk agreements) threaten the feasibility of intergovernmental cooperation. Drawing on collective action theory, this article examines factors associated with overcoming free-riding incentives and provides evidence challenging the idea that governments are prone to such strategic behavior. The empirical analysis of a national Danish purchasing group demonstrates how coercion is not necessary to induce subnational governments to incur private costs to join the group and, despite opportunity and incentive to free-ride, contribute to its production of joint purchasing agreements—collective goods whose quality depends on the staff resources and expertise the participating governments contribute to their production. Further, multivariate analyses find that governments are more likely to help produce these collective goods when they receive more of their benefits, face lower contribution costs, and receive stronger social norm pressures from peers.- Reproduced
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/puar.13727
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