Selling dreams: Endogenous optimism in lending markets
By: Bridet Luc, and Schwardmann, Peter
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Description: 16(3), Aug, 2024: p.492-524.
In:
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsSummary: We propose a model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers engage in self-deception to arrive at beliefs that optimally trade off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design shapes these benefits and costs. The model yields three key results. First, the borrower's motivated cognition increases her material welfare, which explains why it is not driven out of markets. Second, in line with empirical evidence, a low cost of lending and a booming economy lead to optimism and the widespread collateralization of loans. Third, equilibrium collateral requirements may be inefficiently high.- Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20200285
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 16(3), Aug, 2024: p.492-524 | Available | AR133224 |
We propose a model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers engage in self-deception to arrive at beliefs that optimally trade off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design shapes these benefits and costs. The model yields three key results. First, the borrower's motivated cognition increases her material welfare, which explains why it is not driven out of markets. Second, in line with empirical evidence, a low cost of lending and a booming economy lead to optimism and the widespread collateralization of loans. Third, equilibrium collateral requirements may be inefficiently high.- Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20200285
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