Applications of principal agent models to government contracting and accountability decision making
By: Coats, Jennifer C.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 2002Description: p.441-61.Subject(s): Accountability | Decision making | Public administration
In:
International Journal of Public AdministrationSummary: This paper surveys literature from Economics, Accounting, and Management to address theoretical issues in Public Administration regarding government provided services in order to contribute to a formal connection between principal agent models in these disciplines and public policy administration decision-making. In particular, it addresses the question: What theoretical properties of the services themselves might guide (a) the choice of producer of the services (government or outsourcing firm/contractor), and (b) the accountability imposed for the work produced. It is found that a theoretical framework of principal-agent models that includes the decision of whether to contract out can be useful as a first step in systematically formulating the government's decision for a variety of goods/services. This provides an alternative to the identification of key decision properties "from the ground up" for each good or service the government provides. - Reproduced.
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Volume no: 25, Issue no: 4 | Available | AR53215 |
This paper surveys literature from Economics, Accounting, and Management to address theoretical issues in Public Administration regarding government provided services in order to contribute to a formal connection between principal agent models in these disciplines and public policy administration decision-making. In particular, it addresses the question: What theoretical properties of the services themselves might guide (a) the choice of producer of the services (government or outsourcing firm/contractor), and (b) the accountability imposed for the work produced. It is found that a theoretical framework of principal-agent models that includes the decision of whether to contract out can be useful as a first step in systematically formulating the government's decision for a variety of goods/services. This provides an alternative to the identification of key decision properties "from the ground up" for each good or service the government provides. - Reproduced.
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