Why populist authoritarians rarely turn into repressive dictators
By: Weyland, Kurt
.
Material type: 
BookPublisher: Comparative Politics Description: 57(2), Jan, 2025: p.193-218.Subject(s): Authoritarianism, Charisma, Dictatorship, Latin America, Military, PopulismSummary: Why do most authoritarian regimes installed by populist chief executives not become full-scale, repressive dictatorships? As explanation, scholars argue that populist leaders base their rule on charismatic appeal and voluntary mass support; therefore, they do not need harsh coercion, which would undermine their popular legitimacy. While corroborating this argument, I highlight a crucial complementary factor: populist chief executives find it difficult to marshal large-scale political repression. After all, their insistence on personalistic autonomy and unconstrained predominance creates tension with the military institution, the mainstay of organized coercion. Due to this inherent distance, most populist rulers lack the dependable military support to sustain the imposition of harsh autocracy. I substantiate these arguments with relevant cases from contemporary Latin America, especially Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru. -Reproduced
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2025/00000057/00000002/art00004
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Articles
|
Indian Institute of Public Administration | Available | AR136204 |
Why do most authoritarian regimes installed by populist chief executives not become full-scale, repressive dictatorships? As explanation, scholars argue that populist leaders base their rule on charismatic appeal and voluntary mass support; therefore, they do not need harsh coercion, which would undermine their popular legitimacy. While corroborating this argument, I highlight a crucial complementary factor: populist chief executives find it difficult to marshal large-scale political repression. After all, their insistence on personalistic autonomy and unconstrained predominance creates tension with the military institution, the mainstay of organized coercion. Due to this inherent distance, most populist rulers lack the dependable military support to sustain the imposition of harsh autocracy. I substantiate these arguments with relevant cases from contemporary Latin America, especially Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru. -Reproduced
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2025/00000057/00000002/art00004
There are no comments for this item.