Policy commitment as voter mobilization strategy: Clientelist parties, interest groups, and abortion policy in Subnational Mexico
By: Camilla, Reuterswärd
.
Material type: 
BookPublisher: Comparative Politics Description: 57(4), Jul, 2025: p.435-457.Subject(s): Abortion, Clientelism, Interest groups, Mexico, Voter mobilization
In:
Comparative PoliticsSummary: Existing research contends that clientelist parties seek alternative voter mobilization strategies when material exchanges no longer guarantee office. This article argues that engaging in strategic interactions with influential interest groups constitutes an alternative way to mobilize support. Pressured by competition, clientelist parties align policy with interest group preferences and obtain support from members and followers in return. Using a comparative subnational design and primary data, I show how Mexico’s PRI passed a restrictive abortion amendment to obtain clergy support in Yucatan but abstained from reform in Hidalgo where it faced similar competition but perceived clergy as unable to bolster votes. The findings shed light on clientelist parties' voter mobilization strategies and the policy effects of interest group interactions in new democracies and other developing contexts.- Reproduced
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2025/00000057/00000004/art00002
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Articles
|
Indian Institute of Public Administration | 57(4), Jul, 2025: p.435-457 | Available | AR136784 |
Existing research contends that clientelist parties seek alternative voter mobilization strategies when material exchanges no longer guarantee office. This article argues that engaging in strategic interactions with influential interest groups constitutes an alternative way to mobilize support. Pressured by competition, clientelist parties align policy with interest group preferences and obtain support from members and followers in return. Using a comparative subnational design and primary data, I show how Mexico’s PRI passed a restrictive abortion amendment to obtain clergy support in Yucatan but abstained from reform in Hidalgo where it faced similar competition but perceived clergy as unable to bolster votes. The findings shed light on clientelist parties' voter mobilization strategies and the policy effects of interest group interactions in new democracies and other developing contexts.- Reproduced
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2025/00000057/00000004/art00002
There are no comments for this item.