The design of public agencies: overcoming agency costs and commitment problems
By: Yesilkagit, Kutsal.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 2004Description: p.119-27.Subject(s): Public administration
In:
Public Administration and DevelopmentSummary: This article focuses on problems of institutional design from a political perspective. It examines the problems of agentification using a principal-Agent framework, and attempts to explain the choices made between problems of commitment and problems of agency. The fundamental problem addressed is the degree of autonomy possible within a broader framework of political control of policy. - Reproduced.
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Volume no: 24, Issue no: 2 | Available | AR60939 |
This article focuses on problems of institutional design from a political perspective. It examines the problems of agentification using a principal-Agent framework, and attempts to explain the choices made between problems of commitment and problems of agency. The fundamental problem addressed is the degree of autonomy possible within a broader framework of political control of policy. - Reproduced.
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