Are retrenchment laws inefficient?
By: D'Souza, Errol.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 2005Description: p.939-44.Subject(s): Labour
In:
Indian Journal of Labour EconomicsSummary: It is argued that anti-retrenchment laws end up hurting the workers they were designed to project because firms decrease their demand for labour in anticipation of surplus labour during downturns. If free contracting between workers and firms is allowed we show in an efficiency wage set up that both firms and workers can behave opportunisitically requiring third-party enforcement of employment protection legislation. - Reproduced.
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Volume no: 48, Issue no: 4 | Available | AR69371 |
It is argued that anti-retrenchment laws end up hurting the workers they were designed to project because firms decrease their demand for labour in anticipation of surplus labour during downturns. If free contracting between workers and firms is allowed we show in an efficiency wage set up that both firms and workers can behave opportunisitically requiring third-party enforcement of employment protection legislation. - Reproduced.
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