A bureaucrats procurement strategy: budget constraints and rationing
By: Anthon, Signe.
Contributor(s): Thorsen, Jellesmark | Bogetoft, Peter.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 2007Description: p.221-44.Subject(s): Bureaucracy
In:
Annals of Public and Cooperative EconomicsSummary: We investigate a bureaucratic principal responsible for the procurement of goods and services from private agents. the bureaucrat is evaluated on output and controlled by a limited budget. The agents maximize profit, have private information about variable production costs, and have positive outside options which are lost upon acceptance of a procurement contract. The setting is relevant for, e.g. governmental agencies. We show how this setup makes probabilistic rationing and overproduction for low-cost agents a useful tool for the bureaucrat. - Reproduced.
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Volume no: 78, Issue no: 2 | Available | AR75218 |
We investigate a bureaucratic principal responsible for the procurement of goods and services from private agents. the bureaucrat is evaluated on output and controlled by a limited budget. The agents maximize profit, have private information about variable production costs, and have positive outside options which are lost upon acceptance of a procurement contract. The setting is relevant for, e.g. governmental agencies. We show how this setup makes probabilistic rationing and overproduction for low-cost agents a useful tool for the bureaucrat. - Reproduced.
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