Decentralisation and corruption: evidence from drinking water sector
By: Asthan, Anand N.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 2008Description: p.181-89.Subject(s): Corruption | Decentralization | Drinking water
In:
Public Administration and DevelopmentSummary: This article presents empirical findings regarding the relationship between decentralisation of provision of water supply and corruption in provision of services. the current policy advice from the international agencies of aiming for decentralisation as an end in itself is questioned. the conventional wisdom that decentralisation brings management closer to the service recipients and is therefore likely to reduce corruption is also disputed. Drawing on a large database from two large Indian states of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, the interaction between various actors is analysed. We find that the level of corruption in water supply agencies run by local governments is higher than that in the agencies run by the regional government. - Reproduced.
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Volume no: 28, Issue no: 3 | Available | AR79751 |
This article presents empirical findings regarding the relationship between decentralisation of provision of water supply and corruption in provision of services. the current policy advice from the international agencies of aiming for decentralisation as an end in itself is questioned. the conventional wisdom that decentralisation brings management closer to the service recipients and is therefore likely to reduce corruption is also disputed. Drawing on a large database from two large Indian states of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, the interaction between various actors is analysed. We find that the level of corruption in water supply agencies run by local governments is higher than that in the agencies run by the regional government. - Reproduced.


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