Unstable politics: fiscal space and electoral volatility in the Indian states
By: Nooruddin, Irfan.
Contributor(s): Chhibber, Pradeep.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 2008Description: p.1069-091.Subject(s): Political parties - India | Elections - India | Elections
In:
Comparative Political StudiesSummary: What explains variations in electoral volatility? The authors argue that fiscal space - availability of financial resources to enact policy initiatives and provide public programs - possessed by governments can explain the level of electoral volatility. Where governments have fiscal space, citizens reward incumbent parties with their continued support. But when fiscal space is constrained, the incumbent government's ability to provide state resources is drastically reduced. Citizens are therefore less likely to reward the party at the polls and are available to opposition politicians and alternative appeals. Vote-switching ensures, and the incumbent government is voted out of the office. The authors test this argument and others in the existing literature on electoral returns from state assembly elections across 15 major Indian states from 1967 to 2004. The results support the argument that fiscal space influences electoral volatility. - Reproduced.
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Volume no: 41, Issue no: 8 | Available | AR79878 |
What explains variations in electoral volatility? The authors argue that fiscal space - availability of financial resources to enact policy initiatives and provide public programs - possessed by governments can explain the level of electoral volatility. Where governments have fiscal space, citizens reward incumbent parties with their continued support. But when fiscal space is constrained, the incumbent government's ability to provide state resources is drastically reduced. Citizens are therefore less likely to reward the party at the polls and are available to opposition politicians and alternative appeals. Vote-switching ensures, and the incumbent government is voted out of the office. The authors test this argument and others in the existing literature on electoral returns from state assembly elections across 15 major Indian states from 1967 to 2004. The results support the argument that fiscal space influences electoral volatility. - Reproduced.
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