Public-sector reform initiatives in development cooperation: A case study of the Kyrgyz rural advisory service RAS
By: Ritz, Adrian.
Contributor(s): Voegtli, Franziska.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 2011Description: p.591-603.Subject(s): Administrative reform
In:
International Journal of Public AdministrationSummary: Public-sector reform initiatives as part of development cooperation challenge many agricultural support services in developing countries of Central Asia. This article analyses the application of the results-based payment system in the Kyrgyz Rural Advisory (RAS) and identifies key determinants that are likely to influence its effective adaptation. The article is based on a literature review of public-sector reforms in developing countries, donor agencies' program documents, and participatory action research indicate that although the RAS develops in a positive way under the new system it directed it accountability towads the donors, rather than towards local actors. Crucial impediments to the effctive implementation of the results-based payment system are first and foremost institutional uncertainty and the limits of management capacity. These non-intentional reform effects, which are to some extent dirctly opposed to the underlying theories, are discussd in the article. - Reproduced.
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Volume no: 34, Issue no: 8-11 | Available | AR94669 |
Public-sector reform initiatives as part of development cooperation challenge many agricultural support services in developing countries of Central Asia. This article analyses the application of the results-based payment system in the Kyrgyz Rural Advisory (RAS) and identifies key determinants that are likely to influence its effective adaptation. The article is based on a literature review of public-sector reforms in developing countries, donor agencies' program documents, and participatory action research indicate that although the RAS develops in a positive way under the new system it directed it accountability towads the donors, rather than towards local actors. Crucial impediments to the effctive implementation of the results-based payment system are first and foremost institutional uncertainty and the limits of management capacity. These non-intentional reform effects, which are to some extent dirctly opposed to the underlying theories, are discussd in the article. - Reproduced.
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