Normal view MARC view ISBD view

The effect of information on oversight: the European Parliament's response to increasing information on comitology decision-making

By: Brandsma, Gijs Jan.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: 2012Description: p.74-92.Subject(s): Accountability | Decision making In: International Review of Administrative SciencesSummary: The European Parliament, like any; parliament, needs information for scrutinizing executive decision-making. But how does it process this information in practice? This article focuses on the European Parliament's increasing grip on 'comitology' decision-making: committees composed of national civil servants, producing executive measures that are adopted by the European Commission. Two types of changes are addressed: organizational changes and changes in working methods of EP staff. The analysis shows that the European Parliament has effectively built up a system of decentralized police-patrol oversight, but not following more information rights as such but rather as a result of its increasing political powers. The article concludes that information only affects the behaviour of the European Parliament in combination with very specific as opposed to quite general or diffuse political rights. - Reproduced.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Item type Current location Call number Vol info Status Date due Barcode
Articles Articles Indian Institute of Public Administration
Volume no: 78, Issue no: 1 Available AR96290

The European Parliament, like any; parliament, needs information for scrutinizing executive decision-making. But how does it process this information in practice? This article focuses on the European Parliament's increasing grip on 'comitology' decision-making: committees composed of national civil servants, producing executive measures that are adopted by the European Commission. Two types of changes are addressed: organizational changes and changes in working methods of EP staff. The analysis shows that the European Parliament has effectively built up a system of decentralized police-patrol oversight, but not following more information rights as such but rather as a result of its increasing political powers. The article concludes that information only affects the behaviour of the European Parliament in combination with very specific as opposed to quite general or diffuse political rights. - Reproduced.

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.

Powered by Koha