01429pab a2200145 454500008004000000100001600040245007000056260000900126300001500135520104800150650002601198650002101224650001201245773002601257180718b2013   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aKwon, Osung  aFiscal decentralization: An effective tool for government reform?  c2013  ap.544-560.  aThe theory of fiscal federalism asserts that fiscal decentralization increases government effectiveness, reduces government budgets, and reduces corruption when used as a means of government reform. However, counter-arguments have been made that such an approach has diverging effects according to the level of national development. We have attempted herein to carry out an empirical analysis to examine these theories. Data from 17 developed and 17 developing states were obtained in order to conduct a regression analysis of various indicators. The results revealed that fiscal decentralization reduced government effectiveness in developed countries. Important determinants for government effectiveness were the quality of regulation and the rule of law. When responsibility for expenditure and revenue were devolved, budgets expanded in both developed and developing countries. Fiscal decentralization deterred corruption in advanced states, whereas greater autonomy in spending increased malfeasance in the developing world. - Reproduced.  aAdministrative reform  aDecentralization  aFinance  aPublic Administration