01581pab a2200169 454500008004000000100002200040245008900062260000900151300001300160520105200173650001901225773002601244908000601270909001101276999001901287952010501306180718b2014   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aBlom-Hansen, Jens  aComitology choices in the EU legislative process: Contested or consensual decisions?  c2014  ap.55-70.  aStudies show that the EU institutions have strong preferences with regard to the design of the EU comitology system which, consequently, is the result of intense inter-institutional negotiations. However, the exact choice of comitology procedure to install in a given legislative proposal has received much less scholarly attention. Based on a behavioural logic of control maximization, this article investigates the comitology preferences of the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament in the legislative process. The findings from an analysis of all new directives and regulations in the years 1999-2006, a total of 686 acts, show that the Council seeks strict comitology control while the Commission and the Parliament both seek permissive control. This holds even though the legislative process is characterized by a high degree of agreement on comitology. The analysis indicates that this is because the actors strategically anticipate each other's preferences, not because there is a true alignment of preferences. - Reproduced.  aEuropean Union  aPublic Administration  aN  a103776  c103772d103772  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 92, Issue no: 1pAR104236r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR