<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<record
    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
    xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd"
    xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">

  <leader>01441pab a2200193 454500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="008">180718b2014   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d</controlfield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Overman, Sjors</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Resisting governmental control: How semi-autonomous agencies use strategic resources to challenge state coordination</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">2014</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">p.172-192.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="362" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Mar</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Institutional pressure caused by public sector reform leads to strategic reactions from semi-autonomous agencies. Agencies in the Netherlands and France only complied with a selection of imposed reforms. Other rules were manipulated, not complied with, compromises were made. The degree of compliance with reforms is not only dependent on structural aspects, but also on resources and power distributions between the actors. A comparison is made between the introduction of the Dutch Kaderwet ZBO and the French Revision G&#xFFFD;n&#xFFFD;rale des Politiques Publiques. These agency reforms are contested between ministries, rather than between agency and parent ministry alone Parent ministries tend to side with their agencies in both countries. In the Netherlands. power-related issues were most debated, whereas in France money-related issues caused most disagreement. - Reprodu</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Administrative reform</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Lafarge, Francois</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Thiel, Sandra van</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">International Review of Administrative Sciences</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">N</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="909" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">103810</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">103806</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">103806</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="0">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="1">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="4">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="7">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="h">Volume no: 80, Issue no: 1</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">AR104270</subfield>
    <subfield code="r">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="w">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="y">AR</subfield>
  </datafield>
</record>
