01680pab a2200193 454500008004000000100001500040245012400055260000900179300001500188362000800203520103800211650001901249700002501268773005201293908000601345909001101351999001901362952010501381180718b2014   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aBiela, Jan  aThe empirical assessment of agency accountability: A regime approach and an application to the German Bundesnetzagentur  c2014  ap.362-381.  aJun  aRegulation has in many cases been delegated to independent agencies, which has led to the question of how democratic accountability of these agencies in ensured. There are few empirical approaches to agency accountability. We offer such an approach, resting upon three propositions. First, we scrutinize agency accountability both de jure (accountability is ensured by formal rights of accountability 'fora' to receive information and impose consequences) and de facto (the capability of fora to use these rights depends on resources and decision costs that affect the credibility of their sanctioning capacity). Second, accountability must be evaluated separately at political, operational and managerial levels. And third, at each level accountability is enacted by a system of several (partially) interdependent for a, forming together an accountability regime. The proposed framework is applied to the case of the German Bundesnetzogentur's accountability regime, which shows its suitability for empirical purposes. - Reproduced.  aAccountability  aPapadopoulos, Yannis  aInternational Review of Administrative Sciences  aN  a104504  c104500d104500  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 80, Issue no: 2pAR104964r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR