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  <controlfield tag="008">180718b2015   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d</controlfield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Marvel, John D.</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Bureaucratic discretion, client demographics, and representative bureaucracy</subfield>
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    <subfield code="c">2015</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">p.281-310.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="362" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">May</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">For passive representation to translate into active representation, bureaucrats must have discretion. Despite its importance to representative bureaucracy theory, though, discretion has received little empirical attention in public administration. We seek to address this shortcoming by examining the determinants of bureaucratic discretion, paying particular attention to how the demographic characteristics of clients and bureaucrats interact to influence the amount of discretion that individual bureaucrats possess. Specifically, we examine whether the amount of discretion that minority bureaucrats have is positively related to the percentage of an organization's clients who are from the same minority group. We argue that there are three reasons to expect a positive relationship: client demand, managerial deference to bureaucratic expertise, and bureaucratic appropriation. Our findings suggest that a positive relationship exists for African American bureaucrats, but not for Hispanic bureaucrats. - Reproduced.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Bureaucracy</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="700" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Resh, William G.</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">American Review of Public Administration</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="909" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">108666</subfield>
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    <subfield code="c">108661</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">108661</subfield>
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    <subfield code="0">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="1">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="4">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="7">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="h">Volume no: 45, Issue no: 3</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">AR109126</subfield>
    <subfield code="r">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="w">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="y">AR</subfield>
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