01599pab a2200181 454500008004000000100002000040245008100060260000900141300001500150362000800165520102700173650001601200700002101216773004501237909001101282999001901293952010501312180718b2015   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aMarvel, John D.  aBureaucratic discretion, client demographics, and representative bureaucracy  c2015  ap.281-310.  aMay  aFor passive representation to translate into active representation, bureaucrats must have discretion. Despite its importance to representative bureaucracy theory, though, discretion has received little empirical attention in public administration. We seek to address this shortcoming by examining the determinants of bureaucratic discretion, paying particular attention to how the demographic characteristics of clients and bureaucrats interact to influence the amount of discretion that individual bureaucrats possess. Specifically, we examine whether the amount of discretion that minority bureaucrats have is positively related to the percentage of an organization's clients who are from the same minority group. We argue that there are three reasons to expect a positive relationship: client demand, managerial deference to bureaucratic expertise, and bureaucratic appropriation. Our findings suggest that a positive relationship exists for African American bureaucrats, but not for Hispanic bureaucrats. - Reproduced.  aBureaucracy  aResh, William G.  aAmerican Review of Public Administration  a108666  c108661d108661  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 45, Issue no: 3pAR109126r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR