01442pab a2200169 454500008004000000100002100040245010400061260000900165300001600174362001200190520087600202650002601078773003301104909001101137999001901148952010501167180718b2015   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aWest, William F.  aThe administrative presidency as reactive oversight: implications for positive and normative theory  c2015  ap. 523-533.  aJul-Aug  aThe fact that centralized executive oversight of agency policy making is primarily reactive reflects the motives and constraints that define the president's relationship with the domestic bureaucracy. Such a strategy allows for the allocation of limited resources to agency initiatives that are inconsistent with the president's agenda or that evoke conflict within the executive branch or the larger political system. This calls into question the descriptive model of presidential administration as proactive management by a unitary actor, as well as its prescriptive corollary that equates a strong executive with coordination across the bureaucracy. Reactive presidential oversight can produce a kind of ad hoc coordination that can be salutary, but its often pluralistic character can also undermine other important values in the administrative process. - Reproduced.  aPublic administration  aPublic Administration Review  a109067  c109062d109062  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 75, Issue no: 4pAR109527r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR