01338pab a2200181 454500 180718b2015 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Bertelli, Anthony M Mass administrative reorganization, media attention, and the paradox of information 2015 p.855-866. Nov-Dec How does media attention influence government decisions about whether to terminate independent administrative agencies? The authors argue that an agency's salience with partisan audiences has a direct effect, but a high media profile can disrupt normal government monitoring processes and obfuscate termination decisions. This argument is evaluated in the context of a recent mass administrative reorganization by the British coalition government using probit and heteroscedastic probit regression models. The evidence suggests that termination is less likely for agencies salient in newspapers popular with the government's core supporters but not those read by its minority coalition partner. We also find that agencies with greater overall newspaper salience as well as younger agencies have a higher error variance. - Reproduced. Mass media Administrative reform Sinclair, J. Andrew Public Administration Review 109843 109838 109838 0 0 0 0 IIPA IIPA 2018-07-19 Volume no: 75, Issue no: 6 AR110303 2018-07-19 2018-07-19 AR